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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jay Ralph Marsh appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he challenges the dismissal of his petition 
and the court's order denying appointed counsel. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court related the following factual background for this case: 
On July 17, 2009, Jay Ralph Marsh ("Petitioner" or "Marsh") was 
found guilty by a jury of four counts of burglary, I.C. § 18-1401 and one 
count of attempted grand theft, I.C. § 18-2403(1). Following the initial 
verdict, a second phase of the trial took place after which the jury found 
that Marsh was a persistent violator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. During 
this second phase of Marsh's trial, a "penitentiary packet" was admitted 
over Marsh's objection, which contained photocopies of the certified 
copies of Marsh's judgment of conviction for ten previous felonies. The 
Court later sentenced Marsh to a unified term of twenty years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of eight years. After the Court denied his 
request for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Marsh appealed his conviction 
and sentence. On December 22, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of conviction, sentence and the denial of Marsh's 
Rule 35 motion. See State v. Marsh, [153 Idaho 360, 283 P.3d 107 (Ct. 
App. 2011 )]. 
(R., p.16.) 
On May 17, 2012, Marsh filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he 
alleged that his sentence was "abusive" and his trial counsel ineffective. (R., pp.5-11.) 
Marsh also requested appointed counsel to pursue his post-conviction action. (R., 
pp.12-14.) Finding that Marsh's petition failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the 
district court denied his request for appointed counsel and gave notice of its intent to 
dismiss the petition. (R., pp.16-22.) Almost two years later, the district court summarily 
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dismissed Marsh's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.33-36.) Marsh then filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.38-40.) 
In connection with his appeal, Marsh also requested court-appointed appellate 
counsel. (R., pp.48-50.) The court denied Marsh's request. (R., pp.51-52.) 
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ISSUE 
Marsh does not offer a statement of the issues in his brief. (See Appellant's 
brief.) The issue before this court is: 
Has Marsh failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
frivolous petition for post-conviction relief and in its order denying Marsh counsel to 
pursue that frivolous petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Marsh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Without Appointing Counsel 
A. Introduction 
In his underlying criminal case, a jury found Marsh guilty of being a persistent 
violator of the law after his penitentiary packet was admitted into evidence over his 
objection. (R., p.16.) Marsh appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's orders and judgment. State v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 367, 283 P.3d 107, 114 
(Ct. App. 2011 ). Marsh filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion for 
appointed counsel. (R., pp.5-14.) The district court denied Marsh's request for counsel 
and ultimately dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.16-22, 33-36.) 
Now on appeal, Marsh asserts that the district court erred by denying his request 
for counsel and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.1-
4.) He also appears to challenge the court's denial of his motion for appointed counsel 
on appeal. (See Appellant's brief, pp.1-2.) Application of the correct legal standards to 
the facts of this case, however, shows no error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed 
by Idaho Code § 19-4904. "The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed 
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 
P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court 
exercises free review." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting 
Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
C. Marsh Was Not Entitled To Court-Appointed Counsel To Pursue His Frivolous 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Marsh asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not granting his 
request for court-appointed counsel on his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, 
p.2.) There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). A court may, however, appoint 
counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in certain circumstances pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-4904. But the court is only required to appoint counsel when a 
petitioner "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further 
investigation on the defendant's behalf." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 
P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. Marsh failed to 
raise even the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, he was not entitled to counsel to 
pursue his frivolous petition for post-conviction relief. 
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In its "Memorandum Decision and Notice of Dismiss [sic] Intent to Dismiss," the 
district court set forth the relevant legal standards and explained that Marsh's claims 
failed to satisfy the possibility of a valid claim standard. "Every argument Marsh ... 
raise[d] in his petition ha[d] already been expressly rejected by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals." (R., p.20.) The state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the district 
court's legal analysis found at pages 3-5 of its notice of intent to dismiss, a copy of 
which is attached as "Appendix A" 
On appeal, Marsh claims that the district court abused its discretion and violated 
his constitutional rights by denying him counsel in a criminal matter. (Appellant's brief, 
p.2.) But post-conviction relief proceedings are not criminal matters; they are civil 
proceedings which are distinct from the underlying criminal case. Peltier v. State, 119 
Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). And as noted above, when there is no 
possibility of a valid claim, the court is not required to appoint counsel. 
D. Marsh Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
Marsh also argues that the district court erred by denying his petition for post-
conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.2-4.) Where there is no possibility that the 
petitioner's claims could be developed into viable claims, with or without counsel's 
assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the usual 
procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction petition. Workman, 144 Idaho at 
529, 164 P.3d at 809; Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
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establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." ~ (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's 
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unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." ~ 
Marsh's claims were that (1) his attorney was ineffective for not objecting to the 
admission of his penitentiary packet or challenging its contents, and (2) the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. (R., pp.6-7, 10.) The excessive sentence claim is 
barred by Idaho Code § 19-4901 because it was raised by Marsh on his previous 
appeal. See also Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 439, 163 P.3d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 
2007) (petitioner barred from challenging the length of his sentence in post-conviction 
proceedings where he already challenged his sentence on appeal). 
Marsh's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is also without merit because it is 
both "clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings" and provides no legal 
basis for relief. As found by the Court of Appeals in Marsh's appeal of his criminal case, 
his attorney in fact did object "to the admission of the penitentiary packet on the ground 
of lack of foundation and argued the photocopies of the judgments [its contents] were 
not properly authenticated pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence." Marsh, 153 Idaho 
at 364, 283 P.3d at 111. Even had Marsh's attorney failed to object, that would not 
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show ineffective assistance of counsel because, as held by the Court of Appeals, the 
penitentiary packet was properly admitted. kl at 365-66, 283 P.3d at 112-13. 
Because Marsh's claims are either barred by res judicata, or disproved by the 
underlying record and contradicted by the law, they are insufficient for granting relief. 
The district court, therefore, correctly dismissed Marsh's post-conviction petition. 
E. Marsh Is Not Entitled To Counsel To Pursue This Appeal 
Finally, Marsh appears to challenge the district court's order denying him court-
appointed counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.1-2.) Any such argument would 
lack merit under the facts of this case. 
As noted above, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in post-
conviction proceedings, and that is true whether in the trial court or on appeal. See 
Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (the right to counsel extends only to criminal trial proceedings, 
the defendant's "first appeal as of right, and no further"). Indigent petitioners may have 
some statutory entitlement "to be represented in any other post-conviction or post-
commitment proceeding that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate .... " 
I. C. § 19-852(b )(3). But that right is limited to non-frivolous post-conviction applications 
and proceedings. 1st For the reasons set forth above, Marsh's application failed to 
present even the possibility of a valid claim; his appeal from that application's dismissal 
is entirely without merit and the district court correctly denied his request for appointed 
counsel on appeal. 
Marsh has failed to show any error by the district court. The district court 
correctly denied Marsh's motion for post-conviction counsel because he failed to raise 
the possibility of a valid claim. It correctly dismissed Marsh's petition for post-conviction 
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relief because it failed to raise a basis on which relief could be granted. It correctly 
denied Marsh's request for court-appointed appellate counsel because his appeal from 
the dismissal of his petition is frivolous. The district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders 
denying counsel and summarily dismissing Marsh's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2015. 
~-N'C_E_R ___ _ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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INTENT TO DISMISS 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE HISTORY 
On July 17, 2009, Jay Ralph Marsh ("Petitioner" or "Marshn) was found guilty by 
a jury of four counts of burglary, I.C. § 18-1401 and one count of attempted grand theft, 
I.C. § 18-2403(1). Following the initial verdict, a second phase of the trial took place 
after which the jury found that Marsh was a persistent violator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514. 
During this second phase of Marsh's trial, a "penitentiary packet" was admitted over 
Marsh's objection, which contained photocopies of the certified copies of Marsh's 
judgments of conviction for ten previous felonies. The CoU1i later sentenced Marsh to a 
unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of eight years. 
After the Cou~ denied his request for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Marsh appealed his 
conviction and sentence. On December 22, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment of conviction, sentence and the denial of Marsh's Rule 3 5 motion. See State 
v. Marsh, 37185, 2011 WL 6430816 (Idaho App. 2011). 
Marsh has now filed a petition for posH::onviction relief alleging essentially two 
grounds. First, he claims ineffective assistance pf counsel due to his attomef s failures to 
(1) object to the admission of the "nenitentiary packet" as evidence and (2) contest the 
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legitimacy of the prior convictions. Second, Marsh alleges that his sentence, a twenty 
year unified prison tenn with eight years fixed, was "abusive.n1 Marsh has moved the 
Court to appoint counsel to represent him on this matter due to his indigence. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Unifmm Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), I.C. §§ 19-4901 et seq., 
governs this matter. An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that 
is civil in nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a) sets forth seven grounds for granting post-conviction relief; 
(I) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the 
constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in 
the interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional 
release was unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or 
that he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), 
Idaho Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to 
collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available 
under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, 
proceeding, or remedy 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c), the burden of proof for post-conviction relief 
falls on the petitioner, who must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
also Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271, 61 P.3d 626,628 (Ct.App. 2002). 
- .. - -- __ .,,, 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Marsh's request for a court-appointed attorney must be denied. 
If a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief is unable to pay for legal 
representation, the trial court may appoint counsel at public expense. I.C. § 19-4904. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for cou1t-appointed counsel is discretionary. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). Notwithstanding 
the court's discretion, counsel should generally be appointed if the petitioner qualifies 
financially'and "alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim." Id. at 793, 102 P,3d 
at 1112 (emphasis added); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 
(Ct.App.2006). While determining whether or not the Petitioner has the possibility of a 
valid claim "every inference must run in the petitioner's favor/' Id. at 794, 102 P.3d at 
1113. Only if all of the claims alleged in the petition are frivolous may the court deny a 
request for counsel. Id at 792, 102 P.3d at 111 I; Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, ·679, 23 
P .3d 138, I 41 (2001 ), If the comt decides that the claims in the petition are frivolous, it 
should provide sufficient notice regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner 
to provide additional facts, if they exist, to demonstrate the existence of a non-frivolous 
claim. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54, 152 P .3d 12, 15-16 (2007); Charboneau, 
140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. 
The determinations of whether to appoint counsel and whether a petition is 
subject to summary dismissal are controlled by different standards with the threshold of 
the former being considerably lower than the latter. Id at 655, 152 P.3d at 16; Plant, 143 
Idaho at 761, 152 P.3d at 632. Consequently, a district court presented with a request to 
appoint counsel in a post-conviction action must first address that request before ruling 
on the substantive merits of the case and errs if it denies a petition on the merits before 
ruling on the applicant's request for counsel. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND NOTICE OF DISMISS INTENT 
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102 P.3d at 1111-13; Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,885,934 P.2d 947,951 (Ct.App.1997); 
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467,469,926 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Ct.App.1996). 
In order to ascertain whether the "petition raises the possibility of a valid claimH 
sufficient to watTant appointment of counsel, the Court obviously cannot decide the issue 
in a vacuum. Instead, it should make a thorough analysis of the nature of the claims. 
Accordingly, the Court first considered Petitioner's claims with an eye towards the 
"possibility of a valid claim" standard rather than the higher standard for summary 
dismissal. In so doing, the Com1 has drawn all inferences in favor of the Petitioner. 
Petitioner bases his petition on two grounds. First, he alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney allegedly failed to object to the admissibility 
the penitentiary packet or contest the contents thereof. However, this allegation is 
completely unsupported by the record. The Com1 of Appeals made specific reference to 
Marsh's attorney objecting to the packet: 
Marsh objected to the admission of the penitentiary packet on the ground 
of lack of foundation and argued that the photocopies of the judgments 
were not properly authenticated pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
The district court overruled Marsh's objection and admitted the packet 
pursuant to I.RE. 902(4). 
State v. Marsh, 37185, 2011 WL 6430816 at *2 (December 22, 2011). 
The Court of Appeals went on to conclude: "we hold that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the penitentiary packet as evidence that Marsh was a 
persistent violator under I.C. § 19-2514." Id., at *4. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals also referenced Marsh's contention that the 
evidence contained in the packet was insufficient to support a persistent violator verdict: 
In support of this argument, Marsh points to several small discrepancies in 
the information found in the penitentiary packet, including differences in 
Marsh's listed height, complexion, date of birth, social security number, 
and name. 
The testimony of the parole officer demonstrated Marsh was being 
supervised on two previous felony convictions. In addition, the parole 
officer's testimony connected Marsh personally to the judgments of 
conviction contained in the penitentiary packet. Therefore, the record 
11emnnstrates there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier 
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of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of 
proving that the documents contained in the penitentiary packet pertained 
to Marsh and not to any other person. 
Id.,at*S. 
The record is clear, as noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, that Marsh not only 
raised these issues at trial, he also raised them on appeal. Therefore, there is no factual 
basis to support Marsh's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
The second basis for relief in Marsh's petition is that a twenty year unified 
sentence with eight years fixed, for a persistent violator charge was "abusive." This 
allegation also lacks merit. The Court of Appeals has already analyzed Marsh's sentence, 
and this Comi's denial of his request for Rule 35 relief, and concluded: 
The district comi was required to sentence Marsh to at least 
5 years for the persistent violator enhancement and could 
have imposed a life sentence. Marsh has failed to show, 
under any view of the facts, that his sentence was a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
Id, at *6. It is worth noting, as the Court of Appeals did it its decision, that Marsh's four 
new burglary convictions and one conviction for attempted grand theft all occmred while 
he was still on parole. Prior to these new convictions, Marsh had been convicted often 
prior felonies. The Court of Appeals observed: "a review of the entire record 
demonstrates that Marsh's sentence was not excessive in light of his criminal history." 
Id., at *7. Additionally, the Court of Appeals concluded that because "Marsh offered no 
new or additional infonnation demonstrating that his sentence was excessive, ... the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marsh's Rule 35 motion." Id. 
Drawing every possible inference in Petitioner's favor, the Court can find no basis 
to conclude that the "petition raises the possibility of a valid claim." Every argument 
Marsh now raises in his petition has already been expressly rejected by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals. For these reasons, Petitioner's request for a court-appointed attorney must be 
denied. 
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B. Marsh's petition should be dismissed because he raises the same 
issues previously adjudicated in the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
The UPCPA limits post-conviction relief to cases where "there exists evidence of 
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the 
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; ... " LC.§ 19-4901(a)(4) (emphasis 
added). A petition for post-conviction relief is "not a substitute for nor does it affect any 
remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or 
conviction." Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b). The Idaho appellate courts have consistently 
rejected the notion that a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief may base his petition 
on the identical grounds raised in his direct appeal. For example, in Paradis v. State, 110 
Idaho 534,537, 716 P.2d 1306; 1309 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[a] trial 
court need not consider anew in post-conviction proceedings issues previously raised and 
decided on direct appeal." Similarly, in Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33,780 
P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct.App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals held: 
We begin by noting that the scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An 
application for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. I.C. 
§ 19-490l(b). Generally speaking, a claim or issue which was or could 
have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings. Id. . . . A convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the 
same factual questions in his application, in virtually the same factual 
context already presented in a direct appeal. Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 
421, 745 P.2d 300 (Ct.App.1987); State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 708 
P.2d 921 (Ct.App.1985). 
See also Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360,924 P.2d 622 (Ct.App. 1996); Fairchildv. 
State, 128 Idaho 311, 912 P.2d 679 (Ct.App. 1996); and Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860~ 908 P.2d 162 (Ct.App. 1995). 
Based on the forgoing authority, Marsh has failed to present a claim upon 
which post-conviction relief may be granted. As discussed more fully in Section 
III(A), supra, every issue Marsh now raises was previously asserted before the 
Idaho Court of Appeals and rejected. Therefore, his petition must be dismissed. 
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Inasmuch as the Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Marsh addressed the 
same issues raised in Marsh's petition, principles of res judicata and the provisions of 
I. C. 19-4901 expressly bar petitioner from the relief he is seeking. Therefore, the Court 
rules as follows: 
1. Petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel is hereby DENIED; and 
2. The Court hereby provides Petitioner with NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO 
DISMISS his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to §19-4906(b), 
Petitioner has twenty {20) days to reply to the Court's notice of intent to dismiss. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
"e DATED this J 3 day of August, 2012. 
Gregory 
District 
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